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LIVING WITH U.S. REGULATIONS:
COMPLYING WITH THE RULES AND
AVOIDING LITIGATION
Roberta S. Karmel*
One aspect of the internationalization of the securities mar-
kets is the participation by foreign issuers in the U.S. public and
private markets. Despite the regulatory barriers to entry into
U.S. markets and the costs of overcoming those barriers, matters
we have discussed all day, record numbers of foreign issuers re-
cently have issued in the U.S. markets.
In the past three years, more than 350 foreign companies
have registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") approximately U.S.$95 billion of securities. In the last
year and a half, approximately 140 foreign companies have en-
tered the U.S. public market for the first time, bringing the total
number of foreign companies reporting with the SEC to 559,
representing forty different countries. Since the adoption of
Rule 144A three years ago,' 184 foreign companies have raised
capital in new 144A transactions. Twelve of those companies
later went public in the United States.
My assignment this afternoon is to discuss the laws and regu-
lations applicable to all of those foreign issuers after they have
entered the U.S. market. However, I have a totally different
problem than I expected I would have. This is that Elizabeth
Rader,2 Richard Kosnik,3 and the other speakers covered about
ninety-five percent of what I had prepared in my written re-
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Former Commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; B.A., Radcliffe
College; LL.B. (cum laude), New York University School of Law. Professor Karmel is Co-
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1. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1993).
2. M. Elizabeth Rader, Accounting Issues in Cross-Border Securities Offerings, 17 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. S129 (1994), (discussing key accounting and disclosure issues facing non-
U.S. companies, noting flexibility of SEC in accommodating problems).
3. Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to US.
Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S97 (1994) (discussing regulatory issues facing foreign
issues).
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marks. I had prepared an explanation of the various forms that
foreign issuers must file with the SEC as part of their obligation
under the continuous disclosure system that the SEC administers
and some of the problems that non-U.S. issuers have in overcom-
ing the regulations and complying with the regulations.4 I had
then planned to explain the SEC's November 3, 1993 initiatives
to make the task of foreign issuers a little bit easier.' Since I
don't want to repeat what others have said to this very patient
audience that has sat here all day, my remarks will be considera-
bly more extemporaneous and miscellaneous than I had
planned upon.
First, let me give you my own insights concerning the fur-
ther expansion of the market for foreign securities in the United
States and what regulations ought to govern that market. Much
of the discussion by this panel seems to have been a debate as to
whether SEC regulations are perfect and should be maintained
because they are attracting foreign issuers into the United States,
or whether SEC regulations are quite faulty and should be
changed so as to make it easier for foreign issuers to come into
the United States.6
This is an important debate and I have my own views on it.
Very generally, it seems to me that although mutual recognition,
particularly of accounting standards, is ultimately the way in
which regulators and investors will solve the many problems in-
volved in cross-border securities offerings, there needs to be
minimum international harmonization in order for mutual rec-
ognition to be practicable, workable and acceptable to investors.
4. See Rader, supra note 2, at S130-34 (discussing key registration requirements
facing non-U.S. companies).
5. See Kosnik, supra note 3, at S98-110 (outlining recent SEC initiatives regarding
non-U.S. issuers of securities in U.S. capital markets).
6. See Richard Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Markets in a Time of Economic
Transformations, 17 Fo.DHAm INT'L L.J. S77, S85-96 (1994) (discussing superiority of
U.S. disclosure requirements and accounting practices); Pat McConnell, Practical Com-
pany Experience in Entering U.S. Markets: Significant Issues and Hurdles from the Advisor's
Perspective, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. S120, S122 (1994) (discussing superiority of U.S. dis-
closure requirements and accounting practices). But see William E. Decker, The Attrac-
tions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the
U.S. Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FoRDr~A INT'L LJ. S10, S23-24 (1994) (not-
ing difficulty of reconciling non-U.S. financial statements with U.S. GAAP); James L.
Cochrane, Are US. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FoRDrmM
INT'L L.J. S58, S61-67 (1994) (noting need for more flexibility in U.S. accounting re-
quirements)
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In that regard, I think that the SEC's recent decision to rec-
ognize as authoritative International Accounting Standard
("IAS") No. 77 _ that is, the IAS on cash flow - is extremely
important conceptually. Jim Cochrane said earlier this was of
symbolic importance.8 I think it is of more than symbolic impor-
tance, because this is the first time that the SEC has agreed to
accept as authoritative an International Standard. Acceptance of
International Standards is going to be the route both to interna-
tional harmonization and mutual recognition. So I applaud the
SEC for this decision and I hope that the SEC, with the coopera-
tion of International Organization of Security Commissions
("IOSCO"), will in the near future - not in the year 2025, but
much sooner than that - be able to accept a great many more
International Accounting Standards as authoritative.9
Nevertheless, looking only at the technicalities of the ac-
counting issues that have been discussed today is perhaps not as
relevant to the future of the international securities markets in
the United States as you may think.
As far as I know, there are only four ways for business enter-
prises to get funding to finance their activities: equity, govern-
ment funding, debt, and self-funding. Much of what has been
fueling the internationalization of the markets over the past few
years, and in particular the increase in foreign issuer listings and
offerings in the United States, is that sources of funding other
than equity have simply dried up for one reason or another.
It seems government funding is not in the cards anywhere
in the world in the near future. The financial collapse of former
Communist and Socialist countries and the huge budget deficits
all over the Western world make it very difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for economic enterprises to continue to be financed
through government grants almost everywhere. This has led to
privatizations in developed Western countries and in emerging
countries. These privatizations have been the driving force be-
hind much of the internationalization of the securities markets,
7. See Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign
Companies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and
Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Securities Act Release No. 7029, Exchange Act Release
No. 33,139, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,307-01 (Nov. 15, 1993).
8. Cochrane, supra note 6, at S65 (noting importance of SEC's adoption of LAS
No. 7).
9. See McConnell, supra note 6, at S127-28 (discussing work of IASC and IOSCO).
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and in particular behind the decisions of various foreign issuers
to enter the U.S. markets.
Bank financing in the form of loans also is problematic for
the future. Bank capital relative to the need for capital has been
declining for a wide variety of reasons. In the United States, we
are very used to having relatively weak banks. This is part of our
history, part of our culture. It probably goes back to Andrew
Jackson's attack on the Bank of the United States. It is one of
the reasons that we have developed such strong equity markets
as an alternative source of financing to bank financing. In other
countries, particularly in Western Europe, places like Germany
and France, bank financing in the past has been extremely im-
portant. But bank assets are very stretched at this time, and in
addition, interest rates in Europe are high compared to the cost
of capital in the U.S. capital markets.
Self-funding has also been a popular source of financing,
particularly in Continental countries. Germany is a prime exam-
ple. Such self-funding also is somewhat problematic for the fu-
ture, due in part to demographics. Self-funding by way of large
reserves has been related to financing of pensions in countries
where corporations have large so-called "hidden" reserves. One
of the previous speakers said the reason that German, Swiss, and
other foreign companies have large reserves is not to fool inves-
tors.'0 I certainly agree with that. These reserves have been de-
veloped for valid business reasons. One of the reasons they have
been developed is in order to cover the pension fund obligations
of the issuers that have engaged in this kind of accounting.
However, because of the demographics in Europe, Euro-
pean countries probably are all going to have to go to some sort
of alternative system for financing pensions. That may prove to
be more like the kind of pension and savings systems we have in
the United States, which in turn means that you will have the
growth and development of institutional investors in those coun-
tries.
As I said before, equity financing is becoming the primary
way in which companies are going to have to raise capital every-
where. In many situations, the capital markets are considerably
ahead of the regulators. I think that the solutions to the
10. See Decker, supra note 6, at S18-19 (discussing "hidden reserves" of many non-
U.S. companies).
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problems of the capital markets that we have been discussing to-
day will come from investor demands, not necessarily from initia-
tives taken by regulators. Nevertheless, regulation is important.
I will now try to cover some of the matters that were not
covered by other speakers that relate to regulations of the SEC
applicable to foreign issuers in the United States. As a very gen-
eral matter, the regulators in the United States, when dealing
with foreign issuers, have tried to differentiate between govern-
ance matters and disclosure matters. In terms of disclosure, the
regulators have tried to impose upon foreign issuers to the ex-
tent possible the same obligations that U.S. issuers have.
Although there are special disclosure requirements for foreign
issuers, these requirements are very similar to the requirements
imposed upon U.S. issuers.
With regard to corporate governance matters, however, the
SEC and the stock exchanges believe in allowing foreign issuers
to follow home country regulation. Let me give you a few exam-
ples. Foreign issuers who have come into the U.S. registration
and reporting system are exempt from the proxy solicitation and
information statement provisions of Section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")"I - that is, the SEC
proxy rules - and they are also exempt from the short-swing
trading profits provisions of Section 16 of the Exchange Act. 12
Similarly, foreign issuers are not required by the New York Stock
Exchange to comply with the same corporate governance provi-
sions that are imposed upon U.S. issuers. Home country regula-
tion is the regime.
Nevertheless, trying to draw a line in the regulatory sands
between disclosure and corporate governance obligations is very
difficult. As all of you in the audience are undoubtedly aware,
the SEC has long used disclosure as leverage for getting certain
types of corporate governance reforms imposed upon U.S. issu-
ers.
Foreign issuers are subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act'3 and their registered equity securities are subject to the
tender offer provisions of the Exchange Act. 14
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 2 (1988).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) & (e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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In terms of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act, in
my experience many foreign issuers find dealing with U.S. secur-
ity analysts much more troublesome than staying out of the
courts and avoiding litigation under Section 10(b)"5 and Rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act.16 I see our security analyst on the
panel nodding in agreement.
This is one of the reasons why I say that the capital markets
are going to solve the problems that have been discussed today
much more efficiently and more quickly than I think the regula-
tors will solve those problems. Once a foreign issuer enters the
U.S. markets, that foreign issuer has to deal with the U.S. invest-
ment community and security analysts if the issuer wants a good
market for its securities. There really is no point to a listing or
offering in the United States by a foreign issuer if the issuer is
not going to be committed to having a good market for its secur-
ities in the United States.
I had one representative of a foreign issuers say to me,
"What is really troublesome about your system are those security
analysts. My CEO, who is always addressed very cautiously and
politely in our country, gets called on the telephone by analysts
who, first of all, call him Joe,' and then start asking all sorts of
difficult and insulting questions."
I said, "Yes. It's a great deal like dealing with the press, isn't
it?"
This person thought and said, "Yes, that's just what it's like.
Securities analysts are just like reporters."
I tried to explain that this was part of the way in which the
U.S. securities markets work. The framework of securities laws
and regulations try to assure that public companies make the
minimum required disclosure, but the continuous disclosure sys-
tem and the operation of the kind of efficient markets that we
have in the United States really depend upon a constant flow of
material information by issuers into the market.'7 The analysts,
to a much greater extent than the regulators, are the facilitators
that flow of information.
So to a large extent, what a foreign issuer has to do when it
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 241.10b-5 (1993).
17. See Rader, supra note 2, at S129 (discussing flexibility and effectiveness of U.S.
disclosure system).
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enters the U.S. markets is to change its mindset. This sometimes
is much more difficult than it might appear. The problem is not
that the foreign issuer has followed a disclosure regime that has
some kind of a sinister objective of hiding things from investors.
Rather, that foreign issuer has come from a regime in a country
that has had a system of corporate finance quite different than
the equity-based system that the United States has long enjoyed.
That issuer may have been used to dealing with banks and
having the kind of mindset with regard to accounting and disclo-
sure matters that a lender imposes on a company. A lender has
very different objectives than an equity investor has. An equity
investor is interested in dividends and increases in the price of
the stock even if that means the company must take risks. A
lender is interested in the kind of conservatism and stability that
will enable the lender to be paid interest and then to be repaid
the principal that has been loaned.
Whether the switch that is going on all over the world from
different types of corporate finance systems to systems that de-
pend on equity capital is good or bad is hardly for me to say. But
I think we have to recognize that the discussion that we have had
at this Conference all day should be placed in a larger context.
That context is the changes in corporate finance that are going
on in the capital markets and the way in which issuers, investors,
bank lenders, workers, pensioners, and governments, including
government regulators, are adjusting to those changes.
